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Abstract.  The claim that a miracle is a violation of a law of nature has 
sometimes been used as part of an a priori argument against the possibility of 
miracle, on the grounds that a violation is conceptually impossible.  I criticize 
these accounts but also suggest that alternative accounts, when phrased in 
terms of laws of nature, fail to provide adequate conceptual space for miracles.  
It is not clear what a ‘violation’ of a law of nature might be, but this is not 
relevant to the question of miracles.  In practice accounts of miracle tend to be 
phrased in terms of God’s act not in terms of laws of nature.  Finally I suggest 
that the a priori argument reflects an intellectual commitment that is widely 
held, though wrongly built into the argument itself.  
 
Whilst the characterization of miracle as a ‘violation of a law of nature’ is not always 
liked, it seems to capture one of the intuitive ingredients in at least our pre-reflective 
concept of miracle.  Paradigm miracles such as changing water into wine, or walking 
on water, are types of event that we do not associate with natural possibility.  If the 
sorts of things that can naturally occur are consistent with ‘laws of nature’, this might 
suggest that a putative event that is not naturally possible – a naturally impossible 
event – is in some way inconsistent with the laws of nature, hence is a ‘violation’ of 
those laws.1  Sometimes it is suggested that Hume was introducing a new definition of 
miracle when he spoke of a violation of laws of nature (Ward 2002; Nichols 2002), 
whereas Aquinas (for example) preferred to speak of miracle as ‘beyond’ rather than 
‘against’ nature.  However in the Summa Contra Gentiles (III, 103) Aquinas describes 
several grades of miracle, and the highest of these is something done by God which 
nature could never do (quod natura nunquam facere potest).  This is at least 
suggestive of a type of event which involves a violation of a law of nature. 
                                                
1 This is only intended as an expression of an initial intuition.  I will suggest later that this 
line of reasoning, from ‘natural impossibility’ to ‘violation of law of nature’, is not helpful. 
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One of the reasons for a dislike of the violation definition is because it is 
possible, using a particular approach to ‘laws of nature’, to construct an a priori 
argument against the possibility of miracle.  Others though have argued that this type 
of argument is in part based on a poor understanding of what a law of nature is and 
that more adequate accounts of laws should be used. 
In the following I consider various accounts of miracle and argue that whilst 
the a priori argument against miracle is not justified, alternative approaches to miracle, 
based on alternative approaches to laws of nature, do not in fact provide an adequate 
way to characterise miracles in terms of some sort of ‘exception to’ or ‘violation of’ a 
law of nature.  In the light of this I suggest that the notion of a violation of a law of 
nature is not appropriate as a way of thinking about miracles and that we need to think 
instead in terms of God’s act.  Finally I suggest what may be one of the underlying 
motivations for the a priori argument against miracle. 
 
1. The a priori argument: laws as exceptionless regularities  
The a priori argument starts by treating a law of nature as an ‘exceptionless regularity’, 
expressible by the universally quantified conditional ∀x(Fx → Gx), with the variable 
x ranging over actual objects in the world.  A law of this form states that every object 
x that is F is also G.  If there is some object x that is F and not G, then ∀x(Fx → Gx) 
is false and no law was expressed by it in the first place.  Thus if a counter example to 
some apparent law L arises, the definition of law shows that this L is not a law after 
all.  A law L cannot, on this approach, be broken without undermining the basis upon 
which it was called a law in the first place. 
McKinnon (1967) gives a striking formulation of this approach.  In modern 
science (he claims) natural laws ‘are simply highly generalized shorthand descriptions 
of how things do in fact happen’ (309).  Thus to claim that an (actual) event suspends 
a law of nature is in effect to claim that this event did not happen - a miracle would be 
‘an event involving the suspension of the actual course of events’ (ib.)  A generalized 
shorthand for what actually happens cannot be violated by something that actually 
happens.  If we insist that some event actually happened, yet it conflicts with our 
current formulations of the laws of nature, then by definition we must change our 
formulations of these laws until the new event can be accommodated by them.  ‘One 
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cannot maintain both the reality of an event and the adequacy of the conception of 
nature with which it is in conflict’ (312).  
The argument seems too quick and is open to several responses.  But 
irrespective of whether this is an adequate characterization of a law of nature, it is the 
direct use that McKinnon makes of this approach to rule out miracle that can be 
immediately criticized.  For example consider the turning of water into wine and let us 
assume that it actually happened (McKinnon allows for this, explicitly stating that his 
argument against miracle is without prejudice as to the historicity of the said events, 
312f.).  On McKinnon’s approach this is no longer a ‘violation’ of any law of nature, 
merely an indication that we need to rewrite those laws in order to take this ‘actual’ 
event into account.  Technically this means that we would have to give up on defining 
a miracle as a violation, but apart from that nothing substantive has been said about 
miracles as such.  If we can still have water changing into wine, or Jesus walking on 
the Sea of Galilee, the advocate of miracles need not be too concerned by 
McKinnon’s treatment of laws of nature. 
McKinnon though doesn’t treat his argument as merely a matter of definitions.  
He implies that this notion of a law of nature has substantive impact on the possibility 
of miracle as such, when (that is) ‘miracle’ is broadly taken as a divinely caused 
irregularity in the system.  His article strongly suggests that anything that happens 
which is consistent with his definition of ‘law of nature’ – and this will be everything 
that happens - will also have a purely natural explanation, one in which God is not 
involved.  Hence we appear to have an unsatisfactory combination of an a priori 
statement (a definition of what a law of nature is) with a substantive claim about how 
events are to be explained.  The a priori element is clearly expressed: 
 
[T]he idea of a suspension of natural law is self-contradictory.  This follows 
from the meaning of the term (309).  
 
The substantive point is implied without being made fully explicit: 
 
There are no events which are discrepant with, or outside, the course of nature; 
this is because all events are part of nature and because the manner of their 
occurrence is necessarily a part of nature’s natural course (312). 
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It is hard to read this in any other way than as saying that all events have purely 
natural explanation.  McKinnon then immediately follows this quotation with a return 
to the definitional aspect: 
 
There are no miracles or violations of natural law: this is because natural law 
is ... an expression for the way in which things actually happen (ib.). 
 
One gets the impression that after having stipulated by definition that everything that 
ever happens falls under a law of nature, this in turn is taken as meaning that 
everything that ever happens has a purely natural explanation.  Clearly though it is 
possible (for the sake of argument) to accept McKinnon’s definition of a law of nature 
whilst not thereby giving up on the possibility that an event might be specially caused 
by God in a way that nature by itself could not accomplish.  The fact that this God 
caused event would now technically come under the rubric of a law of nature is only a 
reflection on the definition of law of nature that we have introduced.  If we allow for a 
God caused event then whilst (on McKinnon’s approach) this event will be consistent 
with natural law, it won’t have a purely natural explanation.  If we stipulate that a 
natural law is a statement which expresses a generalization over whatever happens, 
that stipulation gives us no grounds for denying that God might part of the 
explanation of an event. 
This same move from a definition to a rejection of miracle as such is 
replicated in Everitt (1987).  His argument is very brief.  If a law of nature is a true 
universal generalization then any exception implies it wasn’t a law in the first place.  
Alternatively we can qualify the universal generalization by adding a ceteris paribus 
clause:  for all x, if Fx then Gx unless God intervenes.  This though has the 
consequence that we rule out the possibility of any divinely caused violation.  The 
exception clause prevents the universal generalization from being falsified (and hence 
violated).  Any God caused event is now entirely consistent with this formulation of 
the law.  The ceteris paribus clause makes it impossible for there to be any God 
caused violation of a law.  So we have two alternatives, neither of which gives us any 
room for miracle qua violation of a law of nature: either the said law was not a law, or 
else the said event  was not a violation of a law. As with McKinnon’s argument, this 
doesn’t at first sight seem to pose any threat to the notion of miracle.  It rules out the 
use of ‘violation of law’ but otherwise seems to leave the substantial possibility of 
miracle intact.  All we are saying is that a miracle will (inevitably) be consistent with 
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any statement of natural law.  This is not though to drop the idea of some event that is 
specially caused by God, one which needs God as the explanation.  All we are 
dropping is, in this context, the use of the word ‘violation’.  Everitt notes this response: 
 
The theist may seek to evade the force of this argument by dropping from his 
definition of ‘miracle’ any reference to the violation or transgression of the 
laws of nature (349). 
 
But he draws from this the following surprising conclusion: 
 
[If] an alleged miracle does not violate the laws of nature, it will be explicable 
in terms of those laws.  In that case, there is no explanatory work to be done 
by the hypothesis that the miraculous event was caused by God.  After the 
natural scientist has done his work, there is nothing left unexplained which 
requires the theistic hypothesis (ib.).2 
 
This is a non sequitur.  Not that the claim is necessarily false (it might be that nothing 
is left unexplained after the natural scientist has done his or her work), but this doesn’t 
follow as a convincing conclusion from this definition of a law of nature.  The 
possibility of a natural explanation does not follow merely from the stipulation that 
everything that happens is consistent with natural law.  This is implicit even in 
Everitt’s own argument given that he allows (for the sake of argument) a form of law 
which includes an exception clause ‘unless God intervenes’.  Whilst this exception 
clause saves us from ‘violation’ it also introduces something that is not open to 
natural explanation.  Everitt’s conclusion, ‘Necessarily ... there are no miracles’ (349), 
is far too strong on the basis of this argument, given that it seems to include the claim 
that everything has a natural explanation. 
In this respect the treatment by Ahern (1977) is better crafted.  He allows that 
all ‘laws’ have an implicit ceteris paribus clause.  This clause is not designed 
specifically with supernatural intervention in mind but with the more general idea of 
any intervening force which may prevent the operation of some law.  The ceteris 
paribus clause expresses the presupposition that no other forces are present.  Under 
                                                
2 Smart (1964, 35) also makes this connection between a redefinition of miracle and natural 
explanation: if we redefine miracle so as not to be a violation, Smart claims that a miracle is 
reduced to being either a bizarre event open to scientific explanation, or a subjectively 
appreciated sign. 
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the law of gravity two heavy bodies will accelerate towards each other unless 
restrained by other forces.  The light bulb in my room does not violate the law of 
gravity even though it stubbornly refuses to depart from its mid air position.  There 
are (natural) reasons why the law of gravity is counteracted in this case.  The law of 
gravity is not ‘violated’ because such counteracting forces are taken account of in the 
implicit ceteris paribus clause. 
Because Ahern is still treating laws under the ‘universal generalization’ 
approach we once again run into the logical problem for a potential violation.  If in 
our ceteris paribus clause we include an implicit reference to a supernatural 
interfering force, then no ‘miracle’ will be a violation.  The law will not be violated 
because it allows for this kind of interference, in just the same way as the law of 
gravity implicitly allows for any natural force which interferes with the light bulb’s 
ambition to plummet downwards.  But if we do not cater for supernatural interfering 
force in our ceteris paribus clause, and yet want to uphold the truth of natural laws, we 
are forced to rule out the possibility of a supernatural force.  Otherwise, in the 
presence of such a force, the natural laws become false: ‘They would be false in virtue 
of the fact that they would support or entail false counterfactuals about what would 
happen when no other natural forces were present’ (1977, 74).  So to maintain the 
truth of natural laws we would be forced to deny the possibility of supernatural force.  
Ahern notes that this is just to beg the question of miracles. 
Given this logical problem Ahern concludes that we cannot frame the notion 
of miracle purely in terms of ‘violation of law’.  We need to have some reference to 
‘supernatural force’.  Walker (1982) covers the same ground and comes to the same 
conclusion: ‘the idea of miracles ... can be explained only by reference to supernatural 
forces rather than to what is or is not logically inconsistent with the laws of nature’ 
(108). The weakness of the argument found in McKinnon and Everitt is that 
apparently from a purely definitional stance on ‘law’ they are able to come to the 
conclusion that a ‘supernatural intervention’ is necessarily ruled out.  But it is more 
reasonable to treat supernatural intervention as a separate issue, whether or not we 
choose to describe what happens from such divine action as consistent with natural 
law or not.  If we take ‘natural law’ as by definition covering everything that happens, 
the link between the ‘naturalness’ of a law and the naturalness of an explanation is 
potentially broken once we allow for supernatural agency. 
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2. Alternative accounts of laws of nature 
A weakness in the above approaches is the treatment of law as a post hoc generalizing 
summary of observed events, which in turn guarantees a law’s status as an 
exceptionless regularity.  We are supposed to imagine the history of the world, tot up 
every event, and then describe all events as falling under some law or other.  Smart 
(1964) and Swinburne (1970) respond to this aspect of the account and believe that a 
more satisfactory treatment of laws gives conceptual room for a violation.  Both start 
from an epistemological perspective on how laws are actually constructed.  
Swinburne says that the scientist ‘seeks the most natural generalization’ of events that 
happen, and where certain events are just too irregular no attempt is made to construct 
a law under which they fall.  Smart notes that when a scientist gets an experimental 
result contrary to some law, the immediate response is not to discard the law but to 
check the experiment.  The formulation of the law is only changed if the contrary 
result is repeatable.  But from this epistemological perspective Smart and Swinburne 
seem to make a quite illegitimate jump to a somewhat stronger conclusion, viz. the 
notion that we can in principle have an actual (correctly reported) counter-instance 
which does not falsify a law.  The ‘counter-instance’ envisaged is not simply an 
‘irregular’ event which has not been incorporated into any law (which is Swinburne’s 
starting point), nor an experimental result which arises from bad observation (Smart’s 
starting point), but a correctly reported event which is a counter-instance of some (on-
going) law. 
Swinburne, for example, from allowing that some events are just too irregular 
to be subsumed under any law, sees this as licensing the suggestion that in principle 
some events could be ‘physically impossible’: 
 
If, as seems natural, we understand by the physically impossible what is ruled 
out by a law of nature, then our account of laws of nature suggests that it 
makes sense to suppose that on occasion the physically impossible occurs 
(1970, 28). 
 
Swinburne wants to say that a genuine ‘violation’ of a law of nature, meaning a 
counter-instance to a law which still stands, is a possibility.  Clearly though all that he 
has established is that some events have been too irregular to be subsumable under 
some law, but this need only register our incomplete grasp of everything that is going 
on.  He follows Smart in describing a violation as ‘a non-repeatable counter-instance 
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to a law of nature’ (ib., 26).  This formulation has curious consequences.  It suggests 
that if a result was repeatable we would not have a counter-instance to a law (because 
the ‘law’ has been shown not to be a law), whereas if a result is not repeatable then it 
could be a real counter-instance to a law that still stands.  There seems clearly to be a 
confusion of perspectives here.  Non-repeatability is normally associated with 
experimental error and this would clearly undermine the claim to have a genuine 
counter-instance to a law.  But if it is possible (let us suppose) to have a genuine ‘law-
violating’ instance (where the law still stands in spite of this instance) then the 
repeatability or otherwise of that instance should be irrelevant.  If it is a genuine law-
violating instance when it first occurs this genuineness should not be contingent upon 
what happens in the future.  The same shifting of perspectives is found in Smart.  He 
uses the terminology of ‘negative’ counter-instances to register that type of instance 
which negates a law and which therefore is not a ‘violation’ given that it shows that 
the law was not a law in the first place: ‘the negative counter-instance is not a single 
event but a repeatable event’ (1964, 37).  By implication a ‘positive’ counter-instance 
(one that does not falsify a law) can only be a single event.  But whilst we can agree 
that a ‘repeatable’ result will naturally be taken as a ‘negative’ counter-instance (viz. a 
correctly reported instance which shows that a law was wrongly formulated), the 
‘non-repeatable’ result is naturally taken not as a correctly reported instance but 
merely as some sort of measurement error.  If we knew that it was correctly reported 
(this being the epistemic assurance that repeatability tends to give us) we would 
likewise treat it as a ‘negative’ counter-instance.  Smart though implicitly shifts 
perspective, seeing his account as justifying the possibility, in principle, of a genuine 
non-repeatable and non-law-falsifying counter-instance.  When we combine this with 
the common practice of not incorporating rogue individual results into laws (precisely 
because we assume measurement error), we get the result that a genuine (by 
hypothesis) counter-instance is allowed to stand yet without being subsumed under 
any law. This is the result that Smart wants given his belief that if something does fall 
under a law it is susceptible to natural explanation (see above n. 2), so it is important 
for the possibility of miracle that there can be an event which falls under no law. 
Arguably though his account doesn’t justify this conclusion.  Both Smart and 
Swinburne shift confusingly between epistemic and metaphysical perspectives.  The 
epistemic perspective clearly provides us with a type of result which need not be 
taken as necessarily falsifying a law (for example the result could be due to 
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measurement error).  But Smart and Swinburne then take this as licensing the 
possibility that in this set of (spurious?) results there could be genuine results which 
still do not falsify a law (because they fall under the rubric of those results which need 
not be seen as falsifying a law).  It is clear though that they have not produced any 
argument for this possibility. 
Suppose we do allow, following Smart and Swinburne, for the possibility of a 
genuine counter-instance which does not falsify a law, viz. a miracle.  There is 
nothing to prevent us from supposing that this miracle could be repeated.  Both Smart 
and Swinburne though have to assume that repeatability entails natural explanation 
(this deriving from the normal criterion of how we discern genuine experimental 
results).  But it is possible, at least as a thought experiment, to construct a counter 
example to this.  Rein (1986) describes a scenario where a healer repeatedly cures the 
blind by touch, in each case this being utterly beyond the power of science to explain 
(assume, for example, that the optic nerves had perished).  This plausibly gives us an 
example of a predictable ‘miracle’.  The inadequacy of Smart and Swinburne’s 
position is in part revealed in that they seem to have to rule out in principle a position 
that is evidently coherent.  On the other hand, as a matter of rationality, there are 
surely grounds for claiming that if a result is experimentally repeatable this will be 
due to natural reasons.  As Robinson (1967, 158) notes: ‘If water were to start turning 
into wine fairly regularly this would soon cease to be considered a miracle.  It would 
just be the way things are, a natural fact about water and wine’.  Irrespective of 
thought experiments about predictable/repeatable miracles, the judgment that 
Robinson describes is I think one that is very natural to subscribe to.  Whilst an 
observed regularity does not (for the sake of the thought experiment) entail that the 
regularity is a ‘natural’ fact, the bare conceptual possibility of setting up a 
miraculously ordained regularity is hardly grounds for placing any weight on that 
possibility.  To this extent Smart and Swinburne’s emphasis on the non-repeatability 
of miracle agrees with common sense and this might obscure the invalid form that 
their argument takes. 
Thus I do not think that Smart and Swinburne’s attempt to establish the 
coherence of ‘violation’ is successful.  This I think derives ultimately from the fact 
that they attempt to do this without explicit reference to a supernatural agent.  With 
such a reference it no longer matters if we define a law in such a way (e.g. with a 
ceteris paribus clause) that no law is violated, because this does not entail that our 
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putative miracle has merely a natural explanation.An alternative approach to 
articulating miracles in terms of laws (and violations of laws) is found in Lowe (1980; 
1987) and Mumford (1998; 2000; 2001), who reject the ‘universal generalization’ 
approach to laws of nature.  Independently of the question of miracle, there are two 
standard objections to a universal generalization approach to laws of nature: ‘First, 
this characterization of laws cannot distinguish coincidental from genuinely lawlike 
regularities and second, virtually no statements of this form are true’ (Mumford 1998, 
88).  One way of dealing with these points is to treat law statements not as 
generalizations over what actually happens but as statements that pertain to the 
dispositional properties that normal members of a particular ‘kind’ possess.  As Lowe 
suggests, ‘natural laws are, I would claim, most naturally expressed as dispositional 
predications with sortal terms in subject position’ (1980, 253).  An example is ‘ravens 
are black’.  This is plausibly taken as a statement about how ‘normal’ ravens are 
coloured, this coloration deriving from some property that normal ravens possess.  
Because the law statement is taken as relative to the normal members of a kind, 
exceptions are easy to account for.  An albino raven is an exception to the law but is 
not a falsifying counter instance.  An albino does not count - for the purposes of this 
law - as a normal member of the kind.  Here we see the operation of a filter at work 
which separates out permissible from non-permissible exceptions to a law.  If a white 
raven were a normal member of the kind ‘raven’, this would be a non-permissible 
exception to the law ‘ravens are black’ – in other words, the law would be false (cf. 
Lowe 1987, 274). 
Lowe notes that a law when seen from this perspective is not quantifying over 
actual individuals nor over possible individuals but over sorts or kinds.  This means 
that the law to some extent stands over against any particular individual, and this in 
turn leads Lowe to suggest that a law of nature has a ‘regulative’ force: 
 
As I see it, the most that a law like ‘Ravens are black’ purports to tell us 
concerning individuals is what we should expect any normal individual raven 
to be like, and apart from this it appears to be concerned rather with 
characterizing the raven species or kind.  Such a law is ‘normative’ or 
regulative in force with respect to individuals, and it is precisely in this that its 
‘nomic’ character resides.  (1980, 257) 
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Once we allow for this ‘regulative’, as opposed to descriptive, dimension of law it is 
easy to see how a law can accommodate exceptions, analogously to how a judicial 
or moral law can ‘demand’ something and yet that demand not be realized.  
Mumford criticizes Lowe’s use of ‘regulative’ in this context and argues for 
a basic disanalogy between natural laws and normative laws.  The central criticism 
is that ‘there is no logical gap between the norm and the normal with normative 
laws of nature whereas there is such a gap in the case of the moral and legal’ (2000, 
275).  A normal raven doesn’t choose to be black and neither can it be said to be 
‘compelled’ to be black, and clearly there is a disanalogy here between the raven’s 
blackness and a response (whether free or otherwise) made to a regulative law of 
the land.  But what does not change when we compare Mumford’s approach to 
Lowe’s is the basic behaviour of the system.  Whilst Mumford still thinks in terms 
of a descriptivist account, his descriptivist account focuses on ‘normal’ members of 
a kind and this still gives us an account in which law statements stand over against 
any particular individual.  In this respect a natural law can be seen as imitating a 
‘regulative’ law.  The central point is that a space is set up between the recorded 
behaviour of some actual individual and a law under which an individual of that 
kind is meant to fall. 
The point can be put in terms of modalities.  The ‘exceptionless regularity’ 
approach to law treats a law of nature as displaying the modal behaviour that 
philosophers typically ascribe to logical necessity.  This is a modal logic in which op 
→ p and -◊p → -p always hold: if p is necessary p obtains and if p is not possible p 
does not obtain.  If stated in terms of laws, this would be to say: if a law obligates p 
(corresponding to op) then p will indeed be the case; if a law does not permit p 
(corresponding to -◊p), p will not be the case.  If these two conditions hold there will 
be no counter instance to anything that is a law (if p is a law, p will be the case; if not-
p is a law, not-p will be the case).  
In a deontic modal logic neither entailment needs to hold (the only stipulation 
being op → ◊p), so we can have op ∧ -p and -◊p ∧ p.  In terms of a moral law we 
can interpret these two possibilities as: p is obligatory but doesn’t happen; p is not 
permitted but does happen.  It is precisely this modality that Lowe and Mumford 
claim characterizes natural law, though (as is fitting) we interpret the box and 
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diamond operators not as obligatory/permissible but as expressing a special type of 
necessity/possibility:  
 
Where miracles violate laws, it shows that what is naturally impossible may be 
actual [i.e. -◊p ∧ p] and what is naturally necessary may not be actual [i.e. op 
∧ -p ].  Whether or not miracles actually occur, this demonstrates that the 
nomic modalities differ from the logical.  (Mumford 2001, 191)3 
 
Use of this modality gives us a way of modeling our intuition that it is not 
conceptually incoherent to think that a law of nature might be broken, in just the same 
way that a moral or legal law can be broken.   
On the other hand this re-use of a modality for a notion of necessity/possibility, 
when that modality is normally associated with deontic terms 
(obligation/permissibility), can be confusing as it sounds as though we in fact have 
logical necessity/possibility in mind.  It is just this confusion that Holland (1965) 
makes creative use of in arriving at his striking conclusion that the ‘conceptually 
impossible’ can in principle occur, and hence that we need not uphold the principle ab 
esse ad posse valet consequentia - in other words something can happen which is not 
‘possible’. Holland can come to this conclusion by in effect working with a deontic 
modal logic.  He prevents the entailments op → p and -◊p → -p by relativizing the 
box and diamond operators to the context of our ordinary understanding, which allows 
the possibility that something can happen which lies quite beyond that understanding 
(in terms of a model for modal logic, the relation between the ‘worlds’ is not 
reflexive).  He then, somewhat misleadingly, interprets these operators in terms of 
‘conceptual possibility’, a phrase which sounds as though it means something very 
like logical possibility.  But as Swinburne notes, by ‘conceptual impossibility’ 
Holland means ‘merely something the occurrence of which is ruled out by our 
ordinary ... understanding of the way objects behave’ (Swinburne 1970, 28f.).  So 
whilst Holland appears initially to have set up a conceptual space which is adequate 
for the notion of miracle (by allowing that an event can happen which is ‘conceptually 
impossible’) in practice the space he establishes can only contain something that goes 
beyond current conceptions and this is clearly too weak for miracle.  Just as Smart and 
                                                
3 Mavrodes 1985 likewise thinks that a ‘legal’ modality is appropriate for laws of nature. 
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Swinburne were not able to set up an adequate space for miracle, so also Holland’s 
use of a deontic modality fails to be strong enough.   
This though suggests that Lowe and Mumford’s accounts may likewise fail to 
establish an appropriate conceptual space for miracle given that they also are working 
with a deontic modality.  This turns out to be the case, and it is apparent that Lowe 
and Mumford are themselves aware that they have not directly established a space for 
miracle in terms of laws.  They set up room for exceptions to natural laws but these 
exceptions need have nothing to do with miracles - albino ravens, for example.  
Albino ravens have a natural explanation, and this is not inconsistent with being an 
exception to a law of nature. If an exception to a law of nature is a ‘violation’ of such 
a law, the terminology of violation is no longer strong enough to separate out miracles 
from non-miracles.  Terminology here varies between theorists.  Lowe is happy to 
speak of albino ravens as violating natural law whilst Mumford prefers not to.  Either 
way some new criterion is required, one that goes beyond ‘exception’ (or violation) of 
a law, in order to account for miracles. 
It is at this point that we find a new criterion being used, one that seems to 
relate to some notion of ‘natural possibility/impossibility’.  Lowe argues that an 
albino raven only violates one particular law (the law expressed by ‘ravens are black’), 
and that we can in fact appeal to another natural law or laws (laws of genetics) to 
explain the possibility of an albino raven (1987, 276).  He suggests that a miracle 
‘would be a phenomenon which altogether eluded explanation in naturalistic terms’ 
(ib.) and understands this as the claim that a miracle would violate the ‘entire system 
of (true) natural laws’ (ib.). 
Lowe gives an example of an event which he believes would satisfy this 
requirement (1987, 276f.).  Imagine a table which hangs in mid air without support.  
This violates the law ‘heavy objects fall when unsupported’.  There are all sorts of 
explanations for why a table might manage to hang in mid air – e.g. some invisible 
support, an anti-gravity device, the table has become weightless, etc. – but for each 
such explanation we imply that the law is not being violated.  For a violation of this 
law we need a table which is genuinely heavy and genuinely unsupported.  Suppose 
that this indeed is the case.  One explanation might be that there is some alternative 
law formulation which embraces both the phenomenon of the table in mid air and the 
more usual phenomenon (as described by the original law) of unsupported heavy 
objects falling.  Lowe notes that the prospects for discovering such a law might be 
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‘particularly dim’ (e.g. if the table phenomenon was not repeatable), and that prima 
facie we would be faced with a ‘genuine miracle’. 
The example though is not satisfactory.  If the table is genuinely without any 
support at all, and genuinely has weight, there is a conceptual problem about the 
coherence of the claim that the table does not fall.  Conceptually we require some 
explanation of this state of affairs, and Lowe seems to concede this (though indirectly) 
by stating that ‘the intentional action of the Deity might constitute the only possible 
explanation of its occurrence’ (1987, 276).  But if the Deity is an explanation, we 
seem to be saying that, by some means or other, the Deity supports the table.  If the 
Deity supports the table there is no violation of the law ‘heavy objects fall when 
unsupported’.  Whilst the event might be naturally impossible it will not be a violation 
of a law. As with the accounts considered earlier, once we shift to thinking of miracle 
in terms of God’s action it is no longer clear that it is relevant to think of miracles in 
terms of violations of laws.  This though in turn suggests that the analysis of laws in 
terms of deontic modality is not directly relevant to the question of miracles. 
Mumford criticizes Lowe’s proposal on the grounds that it is too tied up with 
our ability to think up a natural explanation for a given event.  Even if we are unable 
to think up a natural explanation for the table (after all, there are many natural events 
which we do not initially know how to explain), this would not be ‘sufficient evidence 
for divine agency’ (Mumford 2000, 279).  Mumford refers here to divine agency 
because he in fact defines miracle – independently of any theory of laws of nature – as 
an event with a supernatural cause (2001, 192).  This perhaps in itself is an indication 
that accounting for miracle in terms of laws of nature is problematic, but in practice 
Mumford himself also attempts to delineate a law-violating miracle by reference to 
events of a remarkable kind. 
  Whereas Lowe suggests that a genuine miracle is one that violates the ‘entire 
system’ of laws, Mumford suggests that a law violating miracle is an event which is 
‘an alteration to the natural dispositions of a sort or individual by a supernatural 
cause’ (2000, 280).  This once again is problematic.  Mumford himself (2000, 278f.) 
allows that natural processes can change dispositions.  For example, with mutation it 
could come about that white ravens are entirely normal.  There isn’t any conceptual 
reason why human agents couldn’t cause the dispositions of types of things to change.  
If so the only relevant feature of Mumford’s criterion is that the change is brought 
about by a supernatural cause.  Once again we have moved away from an account of 
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miracle which is given in terms of laws of nature, and have instead ended up simply 
speaking of an event which is brought about by a supernatural cause. 
If we do concentrate on God’s agency we can have ‘naturally impossible’ 
events without any ‘violation’ of a law of nature.  The events are ‘naturally 
impossible’ in the sense that we would have events that could not be explained other 
than by reference to God.  God is not ‘natural’, so the events fall outside the realm of 
what can be naturally explained, and I take this to license the claim that such events 
are ‘naturally impossible’ (though see below).  This is not to say that the event itself 
could not (perhaps) be brought about without the involvement of God.  Perhaps 
natural processes, maybe with the involvement of human agents, could bring about 
the event, and this I take as implying that there need be no violation of a law of nature.  
But the particular occurrence of the event which is brought about by God is not 
brought about by natural agents, and this constitutes a miracle.  Gilman (1989), using 
the walking on water example writes: ‘Clearly, what is miraculous is not that the force 
of gravity is counteracted and a human body made buoyant in water; humans are 
themselves capable of this.  What renders the event miraculous is that the 
counteractive cause of buoyance is the immediate act of a Deity’ (1989, 480).  Gilman 
sees this as support for the notion that miracles ‘either conform to or counteract, but 
never violate, laws of nature’, and hence we should ‘redefine miracles in terms of the 
intentional action of a Divine agent’.  Alston also notes a parallel we can make with 
the normal way in which ordinarily expected effects can be counteracted by external 
intervention - a law of nature takes no account of outside intervention:   
 
A man standing upright on the surface of a lake will sink, unless he is being 
supported by a device dangling from a helicopter, or unless he is being drawn 
by a motor boat, or unless a sufficiently strong magnetic attraction is keeping 
him afloat, or …  Since the laws we have reason to accept make provision for 
interference by outside forces unanticipated by the law, it can hardly be 
claimed that such a law will be violated if a divine outside force intervenes. 
(1990, 56)4 
 
                                                
4 Cf. Clarke 2007, 280: ‘it … seems logically possible that nonnatural entities and beings 
could intervene in the natural world without violating any particular laws of nature. Therefore, 
it is possible to make a coherent sense of supernatural intervention in the natural world 
without invoking violations of laws of nature.’ 
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It is perhaps not clear what a ‘violation’ would actually require.  Hughes (1992) 
suggests that the instantaneous rearrangement of the visible stars to spell out ‘GOD 
MADE US’, would be an example of a violation of the laws of nature.  It might be 
that Hughes is influenced by an underlying thought that this is not merely an event 
that is naturally inexplicable (in the sense that its explanation requires reference to 
God’s act) but that it would be an event which has some intrinsic quality which puts it 
beyond the possibility of being brought about by any created entity or agent. This 
implicit criterion is problematic given that (a) it may be very unclear what bounds of 
possibility we want to place on what can happen in the realm of created entities and 
agents (as Hughes himself allows), and (b) even if there is some act which no created 
entity or agent could bring about, it is not immediately obvious that such an act (if 
brought about by some supernatural being) need imply that any law is violated (it 
might be that the event happens to require a being of a power and scope which can 
never be realized in any created agent, but otherwise this being is still acting within 
nature in a non-violating way, cf. (ii) below). 
 It is worth noting various possible interpretations of ‘naturally impossible’. 
 
(i) A weak notion would be that the ‘naturally impossible’ refers to what ‘nature’ by 
itself, interpreted as excluding the operation of human agents, could not bring about.  
On this notion a watch, or television, is not naturally possible.  This of course is too 
weak for providing an appropriate conceptual space for miracle. 
(ii) A stronger notion is that the naturally impossible is that which created entities, 
whether conscious agents or not, could never in principle bring about.  As suggested 
above, I don’t take this as necessarily implying that such an event is inconsistent with 
the laws of nature. 
(iii) A different notion is that the naturally impossible is some event which has God as 
explanation.  The event is naturally impossible in the sense that without God that 
event would not have happened.  It does not follow that the event could not (at some 
other time or place) be brought about by created entities. 
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None of (i) – (iii) need imply that there is any ‘violation’.5  We might though still 
want to allow for a special type of event which goes one step further.  The idea, I take 
it, would be of an event which somehow involves not merely a supernatural agent, but 
a profound ‘setting aside’ or ‘overriding’ of natural processes.  As suggested it is 
perhaps quite difficult to know what this would involve.  Hughes deliberately refers to 
the star moving event as happening ‘instantaneously’ in order to suggest a type of 
event that is completely beyond the bounds of ordinary possibility.  Perhaps such an 
‘instantaneous’ event would indeed involve a total overriding of natural possibility 
and would properly license the use of ‘violation’ of natural law.  On the other hand 
this is not clear.  We may have only a very limited understanding of the bounds of 
possibility.  And it might be that as we try to push putative events into the undeniably 
‘violation’ category, we end up by positing events that are pushing the bounds of 
coherence.6  This, arguably, places any miracle account under an added and probably 
unnecessary burden.  The problem of miracle is not the problem of thinking up events 
that radically violate ordinary possibility in this way. 
Overall it seems that miracle is not suited to being primarily defined by 
reference to laws of nature.  On the one hand, insofar as we do manage to set up a 
conceptual space between a natural law and what happens, this space turns out not to 
be sufficient for the concept of miracle.  The above accounts have found space for 
experimental error, for something that goes beyond current conceptions, and for 
albino ravens.  Miracle requires an extra move. Arguably the only move we can make 
is to appeal to divine agency, and when we make this move it is no longer clear that 
we need to set up a conceptual space between laws and miracles.  Even dramatic 
miracles, such as changing water into wine, could be envisaged as, say, the 
                                                
5 There is a general question whether any intervention by God might violate the law of 
conservation of energy.  Larmer 1985, who thinks of God’s act in terms of ex nihilo 
creation/destruction of energy, with the laws of nature operating normally upon whatever 
mass/energy there is, does not think there need be any violation of this law (as long as the 
total amount of mass/energy remains constant).  For the purposes of this article I take a 
different route and treat God as though God acts as other (created) agents do, i.e. as acting 
upon what is already created, albeit with greater power and scope.  The parallel with agents 
such as ourselves suggests there need be no violations of laws. 
6 Cf. Larmer 1992, 94 who indicates that he thinks a putative violation of a law of nature 
would push us into the realm of the inconceivable. 
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manipulation of the atoms in the water so that wine results – this would require a 
powerful agent but it is not clear that this would involve a violation of any law.  It is 
conceptually possible that in the future we ourselves will be able to directly 
manipulate water molecules so as to produce good wine.  Whilst we can imagine that 
God changes the water into wine in a radically nature-violating way (as with the stars 
example, Hughes qualifies the event as happening ‘instantaneously’ 1992, 185), this 
doesn’t seem necessary for the possibility of miracle (the water doesn’t need to 
change instantaneously) and might involve pushing us uncomfortably close to a form 
of impossibility which is too strong even for miracle (as perhaps with Lowe’s table 
that remains in mid air, if understood as not supported by anything, supernatural or 
otherwise). 
 
3. Divine agency and scientific intuition 
Whilst there may be no need to define miracle in terms of a violation of the laws of 
nature, the classic miracle events – such as walking on water – arguably do manifest a 
‘violent’ irruption into the normal order of things, at least with respect to our ordinary 
understanding.  We are suggesting that a human being might walk upon water with no 
natural explanation whatsoever.  Perhaps we are saying that God directly holds the 
person up on the water.  Or again, suppose we have a table three feet from the ground 
and it does not fall.  There are all sorts of natural reasons why this might be so and 
none of these reasons means that we have a violation of the law of gravity. The table 
might be being held by someone.  But suppose that this ‘someone’ is God.  Whilst a 
parallel explanation can be made in both cases (natural agents could support a person 
on water, or hold up the table; presumably God also can support the person and the 
table), the fact that we can make this parallel can perhaps make it easy for us to forget 
just how unusual the thought experiment is.  It would be conceptually disturbing, I 
think, to be faced with a table in mid air and the claim that it was God who was 
holding it up.  It might be difficult ever to believe that claim, independently of 
whether or not one believes that God acts in the world.  I think we need to make a 
clear differentiation between the world of thought experiments and our actual 
responses to events.  As already mentioned, Hughes (1992, 186) gives the example of 
all the visible stars being instantaneously rearranged to spell out ‘GOD MADE US’.  
My response to this example is to wonder what our reactions would really be to such 
an event.  There would be nothing ‘silly’ (pace what Hughes seems to imply) for a 
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theist to doubt that such an event was the act of God, though it might well indicate 
some new and disturbing and previously unknown (created) agent at work in the 
universe.7 
 Faced with a table that is suspended in mid air, or even Hughes’s stars, there 
will I believe be an overwhelming tendency to look for a natural explanation.  There 
is a clear sense in which arguments such as McKinnon’s wrongly try to establish a 
substantive claim about miracle from an a priori perspective on what a law of nature 
must be.  And yet on the other hand whilst the a priori argument is unhelpful there is 
undeniable force in what McKinnon describes as the methodological claim of science: 
the contemporary scientific view ‘discards the concept of the supernatural and 
resolves to treat all events as wholly natural’ (1967, 309).  Whilst thus baldly stated 
this seems wrongly to rule out a priori any notion of God as involved in the world, the 
basic intuition which McKinnon expresses is I think a significant feature of our 
everyday reasoning, irrespective of the sort of thought experiments that we can make 
when thinking about miracles.  We look for a natural explanations and this in practice 
is a strong intellectual commitment.  It might be that the unsatisfactory a priori 
argument against miracle in effect builds some such practical intellectual commitment 
into the structure of the argument, turning this commitment into an implicit premise 
that explanation will always be ‘natural’. 
The force of the scientific methodological claim has been expressed by 
Robinson (1967).  He describes the various ways in which scientists deal with 
observations that do not fit with currently accepted understanding (for example we 
might revise our theories or reject the data).  But suppose that a scientist invoked the 
concept of miracle to explain some result: ‘To do this would be simply to resign, to 
opt out, as a scientist’ (159).  Whatever our theoretical commitment to miracle I 
suspect that many people would - in practice - feel extremely uneasy if a scientist 
claimed that some result might be due to a miracle.  This is not I think to be closed 
minded.  On the contrary, I suspect that we would tend to think that close-mindedness 
belonged to the scientist who declared ‘This has no natural explanation, it was caused 
by the supernatural’ - it would, in effect, be a refusal to try and come to any further 
understanding of what happened.  To say that something is not naturally explicable is 
                                                
7 This though will be a point of debate.  Larmer 1984 for example, suggests (using a different 
example) that ‘it may require a greater act of faith to interpret such an event naturalistically’. 
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a major commitment and maybe we are misled by the ease with which we can set up 
examples of miracles. 
These comments about scientific intuition are not intended to be part of an 
argument against the possibility that God acts, in some way, in the world.  My point 
rather is to indicate what I think is a real tension in any discussion of miracle.  On the 
one hand we have the realm of thought experiments and conceptual possibility, on the 
other we have the world of our actual thought processes and intellectual commitments.  
Whilst some anti-miracle accounts do seem to build these commitments in a wrong 
way into the structure of the argument, we shouldn’t overlook that in the rather 
abstract world of theorizing about miracles we might easily ignore commitments 
which few of us, in practice, are willing to give up.  Whilst it may not be appropriate 
to think of miracles as violations of the laws of nature, there remains a way in which 
the concept of miracle does do ‘violence’ to our understanding.  It is, I suggest, an 
open question whether this violence is commensurate with an adequate understanding 
God’s relation to the world. 
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